Geo strategy in mineral raw materials

by EurGeol Manuel Regueiro y González-Barros¹

¹  CSIC

*  Corresponding author: m.regueiro@csic.es

Abstract

Mineral raw materials are vital for economic growth, national security, and global influence. Rising demand for strategic minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earths fuels geopolitical competition, especially amid energy transition and tech advances. This study reviews the global mineral market, focusing on the EU’s production strengths and vulnerabilities, notably its dependence on China, which dominates critical raw materials extraction and processing. China’s geopolitical use of these minerals has led major economies—including the US, Japan, and EU—to adopt policies securing alternative supplies via domestic exploration, recycling, and international cooperation. The EU’s initiatives, such as the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA. https://erma.eu/), aim to reduce non-EU reliance, boost local mining and processing, and support a circular economy. Urgent action is needed to diversify supply chains, invest in sustainable mining, and improve recycling. With critical mineral demand expected to grow 150% by 2060, resource independence and climate goals require global collaboration and innovation.

Keywords

Critical minerals, geostrategy, supply chain security, energy transition, circular economy, EU raw materials policy

Note:

Papers published in this special issue of the European Geologist journal have undergone a thorough peer-review process but have not been copy-edited. Authors bear full responsibility for the linguistic accuracy of their contributions.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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1. Introduction

Global mining production reaches approximately 40 billion tons annually, valued around €1.5 trillion, representing about 1.5% of global GDP (Fig 1 & 2). Mining is critical for key industries such as automotive, electronics, construction, and renewable energy. However, the concentration of production in few countries poses significant strategic risks. This article examines the challenge of securing supply for critical minerals, essential for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and proposes a geological strategic framework to address it.

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2. Global Market and Mining Production

China dominates the production of mineral raw materials, followed by the USA. India, Australia, and Russia (Fig 3). The EU is not one of the key world players in the mineral raw materials sector. This is due to a long period of neglect, combined with a negative social perception and pressure from environmental groups. These factors have resulted in very restrictive environmental policies. Table 1, provides a summary of the EU mineral production.

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Table 1: Non-energy mineral production and production value of Europe (2017). Source:M.Regueiro & A.Alonso (2020).

Subsector	Production Mt	Production value M€	%
Aggregates	2.700	15.000	33.33
Industrial minerals	180	14.000	31.11
Dimensional stones	27	8.400	18.66
Metallic minerals	800	7.600	16.88
Total	3.707	45.000 (0,3% GDP)	100

Global mineral demand is driven by industry, infrastructure, and energy technologies (Fig. 4). Developing countries prioritize infrastructure and heavy industry (industrial minerals, ferrous/base metals), while industrialized nations focus on cars, electronics, aeronautics, and high-tech sectors requiring base and critical metals.

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Modern life relies on diverse metals for high-performance technologies from microchips to superalloys. Graedel et al. (2015) note rising material complexity over 50 years, with lifecycle analyses showing losses, low recycling, and trade dependence (e.g., China’s 2005 nickel cycle); several metals like rhodium, platinum, and REEs face high supply risks, no substitutes excel across uses, and population/wealth growth will boost global material use 111% by 2060 (OECD, 2018) despite saturation in bulk metals. Energy transitions demand lithium, cobalt, and nickel, requiring new mines, sustainable mining, automation, and digital tech to manage scarcity.

3. Global dependency and Supply Risk

Amid rising global metal demand, some countries dominate production. Figure 5 (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2019) shows China as the top source for 47 of 73 elements (64%) in the periodic table of annual production.

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According to IEA (2022), 2019 production of many energy transition minerals was more geographically concentrated than oil or gas. Figure 6 illustrates China’s dominance, not only in extracting key minerals like Rare Earths but also in controlling their processing industry.

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At the same time, the geographical location of the main world critical minerals production poses another political risk as depicted in Figure 7 (EU.2020), where many of these resources come from low to medium GDP countries, which might be are subjected to political pressures and potential corruption, both meaning potential interruption of the supply. The World Bank. (2022), also confirms this statement.

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4. The energy context

Coal powered the Industrial Revolution (steel, railways, steamships) but was later deemed exhaustible (Clark & Jacks, 2007); oil displaced it in the 1960s amid transport growth, though coal remains vital for electricity, 64% of steel, and cement, with reserves lasting, by some estimates, 112 years (Energy Institute 2023; World Coal Association 2023). Fossil fuels defined 20th-century geopolitics, while 21^st-century struggles shift to water and minerals amid renewables, impacting global trade.

Renewables (incl. hydro) grew in 75/79 countries (2017-2024), doubling yet meeting only 8% of total final energy demand; China led growth (>7 exajoules), followed by US/India, with Europe topping rankings and Middle East lagging (Kiran Baygin & Çil, 2023).

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5. Supply chain strategic issues

Major powers face supply chain security risks for minerals vital to clean energy (Fourth Industrial Revolution) and defense technologies, with U.S., EU, and Japan dependent on foreign sources weaponized by China. Western and military industries are vulnerable amid Ukraine/Gaza wars; Fig. 9 details tank raw materials (IISS 2024), while Fig. 10 (Girardi et al. 2023) assesses 40 CRMs for EU defense, noting vulnerabilities (China, Russia, DRC) and recommending diversification, transatlantic ties, and defense-specific policies distinct from green/digital shifts.

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6. International strategies

China. Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 quote—”The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths”[1]—signalled China’s policy of using minerals geopolitically, restricting RE exports (e.g., to Japan in 2010 over Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute) and controlling standards (5G, AI) via ISO influence. Despite domestic pollution concerns, China shifted mining abroad via BRI, controlling 60 mines in 2018 ($21.5B investment; copper/cobalt $8B) expanding to >100 by 2025, including Muga potash (Spain) and Nicaragua’s 85,000 Ha. In Africa, investments hit 12.3% of 2020 exploration (up from 8.1% 2011), controlling 28% copper (DRC/Zambia), 41% cobalt; key areas: Southern/West Africa, Pacific Basin (Australia/Canada/Latin America), neighbours (Mongolia/Myanmar), with 25 EU assets (Nakano, 2021). Recent 14th Five-Year Plan and export laws mirror U.S. security measures; reduced iron ore buys might threaten Spain’s Alquife mine project by global price volatility influenced by shifts in demand, including from major consumers like China.

USA. The National Defense Reserve (NDR), created in WWII to secure critical resources, saw most materials sold after the Cold War. The 2019 Energy Resource Governance Initiative aimed to improve governance, supply chain resilience, and meet future clean energy mineral demand, with agreements in several countries. The 2021 American Critical Minerals Independence Act promoted domestic exploration, research, processing, and supply chain resilience, supported by executive reviews. In 2022, $125M was invested in the NDR alongside the Prosper Africa plan to counter China’s influence amid trade tensions. In 2025, Trump threatened Greenland invasion, imposed tariffs, signed critical minerals agreements with Ukraine, China, Japan, Malaysia, and pushed for mining in the US with fewer environmental rules. Figure 11 is a map that highlights key infrastructure projects and investments related to critical minerals (cobalt, nickel, copper, lithium, and manganese) across Africa. These projects are supported by U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) grants and private investments, focusing on enhancing the supply chain for minerals essential to modern technologies such as electric vehicles and renewable energy. This is a clear image of the USA copying the strategy that China has been deploying since 1992.

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Japan. After the 2010 rare earth export restrictions by China, Japan reduced its dependence from 90% to 58% by 2025 through global diversification, backed by state-owned JOGMEC (Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, founded 2004 from JNOC and MMAJ merger), under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry—mirroring Spain’s 1960s ENADIMSA model applicable to the EU. Japan relocates high-value production from China to its territory and Southeast Asia, exemplified by the October 2025 Critical Minerals/Rare Earths Framework with the USA to interconnect allied supply chains globally.

The EU initiated as early as 2001 its Sustainable Development Strategy and Thematic Strategy on Natural Resources (2005), but the pivotal Raw Materials Initiative (COM/2008/0699) addressed supply via global markets, local extraction, and recycling. Subsequent efforts included the 2011 EU Strategy on Materials Markets, ETPSMR platform, Innovation Partnership for Non-Energy Raw Materials, EIT Raw Materials (2014), and ERMA (2020) to build resilient chains, cut primary CRM dependence through circularity, and diversify third-country sources while respecting trade obligations. The latest critical minerals list (Figure 12) pinpointed the mineral resources where the problem of supply was undoubtedly critical. This is better appreciated in Figure 13 that shows the percentage of critical materials supplied by China to Europe in 2024.

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The Critical Raw Materials Act (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj/eng) mandates 10% EU extraction, 40% processing, 15% recycling of critical raw materials, and no more than 65% from any third country. Strategic projects now receive fast-tracked approvals and funding, with results pending. Europe holds vast resources (Fig. 14), making CRMA a bold theoretical step—we will see.

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7. Discussion

The global mining industry drives 81 economies (half the world’s population) and key sectors like automotive, electronics, and construction, with metal material consumption projected to rise 111% by 2060. Addressing this challenge requires a multi-pronged approach. Access to critical materials is crucial for the de-carbonization of the economy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Critical mineral shortages (lithium, cobalt, nickel, REEs, graphite) bottleneck energy transitions [2], exacerbated by COVID-19 and wars, spurring policies from USA, EU, and Japan for autonomy. China advances mineral colonization since 1992 via Africa/Asia/Latin America investments; USA prioritizes domestic production sans climate focus; EU targets 2050 neutrality via local resources/circularity; Japan favours global sourcing.

8. Conclusions: A way forward and the key role of geology

We reviewed global challenges in securing steady mineral supplies. Critical minerals production is concentrated in few countries (China leads rare earths), mining causes biodiversity loss and emissions, and recycling will cover only 20% of demand by 2050. Geology is vital to find new deposits, assess impacts, and support sustainable mining. Future progress depends on interdisciplinary training, technology, and global cooperation. Securing critical minerals requires integrated strategies focused on diversification, sustainability, and innovation to ensure supply chain security and support energy transition. Geology is essential for discovering and characterizing new deposits, assessing environmental and social impacts, and supporting mining integration within sustainable development models. Interdisciplinary training, the use of new technologies, and global collaboration will determine the sector’s future. Securing critical mineral raw materials is a strategic challenge requiring an integrated approach with geology at its core. Diversification, sustainability, and innovation are imperative to maintain the competitiveness and security of global supply chains, contributing to sustainable development goals and the global energy transition.

Proposed measures include: Diversifying supply and promoting sustainable local sources via geographic diversification and strategic partnerships, increasing recycling and reuse through urban mining, battery recycling programs, design for recyclability, and material substitution, investing in exploration and new mining technologies including sustainable practices, automation, and digitalization, creating strategic reserves by governments, private sectors, and allies to reduce supply risks,  innovating technologies such as alternative battery chemistries, efficient energy systems, and advanced ore processing, implementing governance and cooperation with mineral strategies, trade agreements, transparency, and ESG standards, managing demand by improving energy efficiency, second-life applications for batteries, and prioritizing minerals for decarbonization impact.

Funding: “This research received no external funding”.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest

[1] The speech in 1992 was part of the “Southern Tour” to restart economic reforms and opening after the Tiananmen setback, during the inspection of rare earth mining and processing facilities in Baotou, one of China’s main production areas. In fuller versions, he added that China’s rare earth reserves accounted for about 80% of known world reserves and that their strategic importance was comparable to Middle Eastern oil, stressing the need to “manage this resource well” to leverage China’s advantage. The phrase underscores that, just as Middle Eastern oil shaped 20^th-century geopolitics, rare earths could become the key resource of the 21^st century and a tool of industrial and geopolitical power for China.

[2] For example, the cathode/anode of the electric vehicle Li-ion batteries need lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite. The permanent magnets in generators and cabling of wind turbines need rare earths such as neodymium, dysprosium, praseodymium, terbium and copper. The solar panels in their photovoltaic cells and conductive paste demands silver, silicon, tellurium, indium and gallium.         

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This article has been published in European Geologist journal 61 – 5th IPGC Special Edition 2