European Geologist Journal 59

Inconvenient Truths on Metal Requirements for the Green Transition – Further Insights and SDGs

 

by Eamonn Grennan1,* and John A. Clifford2

1  Retired

2  Director – Exploration, Minco Exploration Plc

Contact: eamonn.grennan@outlook.ie

Abstract

This paper emphasises the fundamental role of geology in the circular economy, advancing the green transition, and achieving meaningful progress towards the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Over-reliance on the circular economy concept tends to obscure the necessity of funding successful mineral exploration, as does the drift away from grass-roots exploration by many multinational mining, oil, and gas companies. Incorrect assumptions regarding the supply, use, and recycling of raw materials in the green economy are identified. The immovable nature of mineral deposits and their inherent composition continues to pose a challenge for policymakers, environmental advocates, and intergovernmental organisations alike. The paper highlights that without successful mineral exploration many of the SDGs are unachievable.

Cite as: Grennan, E., & Clifford, J. (2025). Inconvenient Truths on Metal Requirements for the Green Transition – Further Insights and SDGs. European Geologist, 59. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16442172

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

1. Introduction

This paper addresses the topic under four headings, namely the circular economy, mining and mineral exploration, and the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In his presentation, Grennan [1] adopted Al Gore’s famous quotation from 2006, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ to draw attention to at least 10 ‘Inconvenient Truths’ being ignored by the proponents of the green agenda, by pointing out that it ignores the many aspects that require geology-based solutions. This is further exacerbated by the failure of the UN to address the issue in its 17 SDGs. This paper does not dispute the reality of climate change; rather it critically examines some of the ideas and strategies being proposed to address it. Geology lies at the heart of this issue, because there can be no green transition without it.

The EU in general severely lacks the production of indigenous raw materials. Difficulties with supplies of unexploited raw materials have been a growing source of concern over the previous decade. Commissioner Šefčovič [2], Vice President of the European Commission commented that ‘Without undertaking its own exploration, the EU will have no mining projects. This, in turn, means no refineries and, without refining capacity, the EU will continue to be in great part dependent on foreign supplies of high-quality materials.’ 

This was followed by similar comments from Commissioner Breton and culminated in the action initiated by President Von der Leyen, who proposed the Critical Raw Materials Act. These remarks were then followed by another supportive commentary from Mario Draghi [3] who recently commented that Europe is dependent ‘on a handful of suppliers for critical raw materials, especially China, even as global demand for those materials is exploding, owing to the clean energy transition.’ This criticality has been supported in detail by a series of reports (2010-2023) [4], describing the supply problems and the identification of what came to be called Critical Raw Materials (CRMs). The number of CRMs has grown from 14, in 2010, to 34, in 2023, whereas 50 have been identified in the United States. This reflects the failure of the EU to develop its own supply of indigenous raw materials. This period has also witnessed the creation of a number of subsets, for example, Strategic Raw Materials (‘SRMs’). With just a few exceptions, governmental and corporate response within Europe has been one of inaction or disinterest. This is due to several overriding factors: the absence of funding for high-risk projects; inhibiting bureaucracy, particularly in the permitting sphere; failure to recognise the necessity of support for SMEs, who are the principal group involved in the discovery and development of these materials; and the impact of ill-conceived environmental designations. The overall outcome is that even deposits which are known to contain substantial amounts of materials critical for the green transition economy have not been allowed to proceed due to a combination of lack of funds and/or failure to obtain planning/development permission.

There is an old saying in English, ‘the grass is always greener on the other side’ and there is an equivalent one in Gaelic, ‘Is glas iad na cnoic i bhfad uainn’, meaning the far away hills are greener, and we suspect that there are equivalent ones in most European languages. The use of this proverb is very appropriate in the present circumstances as we discuss green energy and the green transition. Europe has effectively ‘exported’ its manufacturing industries, as well as the associated carbon emissions, and the resultant smog is therefore located in China and elsewhere throughout the world. This policy has rendered the nearby hills and mountains in Europe greener. However, the mountains and hills faraway are not green, but a shade of brown. Given that climate change is a worldwide phenomenon, it matters not at all where the emissions occur, and this is one of the greatest delusions that Europe holds.

This paper will review some of the relevant SDGs with respect to their impact on resource supply and upon the impact of resource supplies or the lack thereof. Effectively, only a few of the SDGs are directly concerned with the supply of resources.

2. Historical Parallels

At the advent of every industrial epoch the required metal or mineral had to be found. Thus, it was iron in the Iron Age, copper and tin for the Bronze Age, silver and gold for coinage and trade, coal as a fundamental resource for the Industrial Revolution and in the present electronic age, the requirements for gallium, germanium, indium, silicon and rare earths, to name but five. This does not even include the massive amounts of Lithium required to produce batteries to support the electrification of our infrastructure. These metals are the starting point for much of today’s industrial activity. Even after their use becomes widespread, and despite reuse and recirculation, there will be a continued demand for increased production if global inequality is to be reduced as envisaged by SDGs 8, 9 and 10.

3. Circular Economy

The concept of circular economy is a misconception, because there has been a deliberate attempt by many to ignore the importance of its starting point, which is mineral exploration (Grennan, 2023). The (inverted) snail diagram (Figure 1) is more appropriate. Given the concept of the geological timescale and the time required to bring a mineral deposit into production, this might be a more apt, albeit accidental, description.

Figure 1: Circular Economy.

Many of the advocates of the green agenda either ignore or do not recognise the reliance on new sources of raw materials to achieve their aims. The concentration by many western countries on emissions rather than carbon footprint, which is the export of emissions, has three fundamental flaws:

  1. It ignores the fundamental importance of finding and developing new sources of raw materials;
  2. It also means that we, in the West, will in effect be exporting large waste dumps to developing countries;
  3. It forecloses the possibility that in the future some elements within those waste dumps which are of no economic value today, may suddenly become valuable if modifying factors change, but by then they will be in a waste pile or the tailings overseas.

3.1 Nuclear Power Generation

Nuclear power was heralded in the 1960s as being the answer to a decrease in hydrocarbon supplies and the requirement for an endless supply of electric power. Yet, its negative association with the atomic bomb, its inherent dangers, several serious accidents, and the disposal of its waste, have raised many concerns [5]. Notwithstanding, today the importance of nuclear power is recognised as a critical part of Europe’s energy security strategy: ‘Nuclear energy is a low-carbon alternative to fossil fuels and accounts for almost 26% of the electricity produced in the EU’, (EuroParl, 2024). Yet, exploration and development of uranium resources is banned in a sizeable number of European member states.

3.2 Wind and Solar Power

Whilst there is a significant degree of flexibility with respect to where one can develop a solar farm, that flexibility does not extend to wind farms. There is a tendency by governments and environmentalists to dictate where wind farms can be constructed, without any thought being given to the regularity of wind, its velocity, the ground conditions (especially offshore), or proximity to present day infrastructure.

3.3 Electric vehicles (EVs)

Those promoting the green transition conveniently ignore the fact that before you start to recirculate a metal, it must already have been produced to be available for recirculation. For example, historically, lithium was not in widespread use. The lithium batteries now in use have an estimated life expectancy of 25 years. This effectively means that there will be no opportunity for significant recycling for 25 years. This means we require new supplies of the resource to fill the supply gap over these 25 years. Over this period lithium batteries may become obsolete and therefore non-recyclable.

3.4 Substitution

As noted earlier, the concept of resource use is commonly described as circular. However, this representation does not adequately acknowledge the underlying structural strain. This is best illustrated geometrically by the upper part of the circle, being absent, with the two endpoints being joined by a chord under tension, symbolising the lack of new raw materials entering the system (Figure 2), in combination with the inability of substitute materials to replicate the properties of the original resources, and the continued failure of recycling systems to achieve anything approaching 100% recyclability.

Figure 2: Real Circular Economy.

Furthermore, the unique properties of certain elements are often unmatched by their substitutes. For instance, it is questionable whether consumers, particularly among younger generations, would accept a smartphone with inferior capabilities. In many cases, no real substitutes exist for specific end-uses. For example, neodymium-iron-boron is the strongest known permanent magnetic material and commands a high market value, yet recycling such magnets remains technically challenging. By contrast, some elements, such as recycled copper, retain properties equivalent to those of primary copper.

3.5 Recycling of Metals

While some acknowledge that losses during the extraction phase are inevitable, there is a general understanding that companies make genuine efforts to minimise them, although such losses are, to some extent, unavoidable. Losses and non-recovery also occur during the metallurgical and processing phases. This is exemplified by the incomplete recovery of trace elements from the fluxes and ashes associated with certain processing methods. Furthermore, metals such as copper, zinc and iron are characterised by long services lives. The International Copper Study Group estimates that 470,000 kilo tonnes of copper are currently in use, and that 32% of global demand in 2023 was met through recycled copper, with new copper production of 22.3 Mt required to address the shortfall [6].

The recycling of metals has a much longer tradition than is often realised. In fact, it has been going on since metallic products were first made, although some contemporary environmental advocates often think that they have just invented the process. The stripping of lead from church roofs in Ireland during Cromwellian times had a threefold objective: supply of lead for weaponry, the contained silver for wealth creation, and the destruction of the Catholic Church. The conquest of South America is just an example of large-scale recycling of gold and silver ornaments [7]. More recently, the recycling of other metals such as Al, Cu, Ni, Pb, Pt and Zn has become an integral part of modern metal production. Within the EU, over 90% of end-of-life stainless steel is recycled, and more than 35% of global crude steel was produced from secondary raw materials in 2017. Even though recycling one tonne of steel saves 1.4 tonnes of iron ore, primary iron ore production continues to increase [8].

The recycling of rare earths and other trace elements, such as Co, is currently problematic for many reasons: their dissipative usage, exceedingly small amounts in individual devices, complex chemistry, high collection costs and the energy-intensive nature of their recovery may make their secondary use prohibitively expensive.

3.6 Outlive Usefulness / Become Redundant

Lithium is a cornerstone of the EV market and whilst supplies have stabilised, its recyclability remains in question, or at least, it is difficult to obtain a clear answer, especially with respect to metal fatigue.

One of the major problems associated with alternative energies relates to the supply of specialty metals and other proposed methods of energy generation and energy storage. At present, there is considerable discussion about alternatives to lithium battery-powered vehicles. It is not within our remit to comment on the feasibility and timelines associated with hydrogen-based power generation but for the sake of argument, let us assume that it is brought on-stream in a cost-effective manner within the next 10 years. This would effectively eliminate the use of lithium batteries in cars and buses – undermining one of the most economically viable pathways for lithium reuse.

3.7 Lack of Investment and Lack of Interest.

In a recent interview and report on the BBC on 26 February 2025, BP, the energy giant, revealed a shift in strategy when it announced that it will cut its renewable energy investments and instead focus on increasing oil and gas production. BP said it would increase its investments in oil and gas by about 20% to $10bn (£7.9bn) a year, while decreasing previously planned funding for renewables by more than $5bn (£3.9bn). This announcement follows similar actions by rivals Shell and the Norwegian company Equinor, both of which have also scaled back their plans to invest in green energy. Murray Auchincloss, BP’s chief executive, remarked that the company had gone ‘too far, too fast’ in the transition away from fossil fuels, and that its faith in green energy was ‘misplaced’. He added that, going forward, BP will be ‘very selective’ in investing in businesses involved in the energy transition to renewables, with funding reduced to between $1.5 billion and $2 billion annually [9].

3.8 Accessory Metals / By-Products

Many of the critical elements are—and indeed were—in short supply even before their present popularity, as they had little industrial application. Others are produced only as by-products of a base metal mine or smelter. For example, germanium is present in sphalerite, gallium is present in bauxite, and cobalt is associated with some copper ores. Whilst their new-found purposes are especially important, the fact remains that the vast bulk of ECEs and SRMs are still being recovered through the processing and purification of bulk metals.

About two-thirds of the world’s cobalt is produced from copper-rich deposits in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 2019 when the DRC exported circa 100,000t of Co, it had to mine 33 Mt of rock. Most Ga is produced as a minor by-product of alumina/aluminium derived from bauxite ores. The average content in bauxite ores is approximately 50ppm, but only 1-2% is recovered, costs are usually cited as the main reason for such poor recovery rates. In other words, nothing comes cheaply.

3.9 Security of Supply

After being stable for a decade or more, the global geopolitical landscape is now changing rapidly, with many certainties being questioned, not least due to climate change and the challenge of managing the green transition within a democratic framework.

Delivery of raw materials to a market is a lengthy and protracted process. Currently it takes almost two decades to move from discovery to production, a statistic further compounded by the fact that less than half of all discoveries make it to production [10]. Thus, if we are to ensure security of supply, we need to be exploring today for our resource requirements of 2050.

Allied to this are the usual geological uncertainties and the Just-in-Time (JIT) system of product delivery. The following list of factors is not exhaustive, it is solely illustrative: the long time (often exceeding 10 years) between initial grass-roots exploration and discovery; mine feasibility studies, planning and development; mining and production; metal processing and purification; product development and the long supply chains associated with sales and deliveries – a total upwards of 30 years. Within this entire process, there is intense competition for investment finance in a risk-averse market.

4. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The UN SDGs were launched in 2015 with the publication of ‘Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ [11]. The vision espoused in that document provides ‘a plan of action for people, planet, and prosperity.’ Neither mineral exploration nor mining are referenced even once in the document. ‘Natural resources’ are mentioned eight times. This is surprising, given the critical role that mineral exploration and mining must play in achieving the goals set out in the document.

  • SDG7 is to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.

Although all the terms and ideals within this objective are simple and admirable, they lack clarity. What is modern? Oil and gas were once seen as modern compared to coal, lignite, turf, and wood. Nuclear energy was supposedly very modern but suffered and continues to suffer from negative connotations. Then wood-derived energy came back into fashion. The onset of biofuels caused a spike in food prices. Wind and solar heating, along with heat pumps, are all classified as modern energy sources, but they require electricity to function. In addition, if winds speeds are too low or too high, or solar panels become defective or dirty, little to no power is generated. Yet, wind and solar energy are strongly promoted in Europe, but rarely, if ever, are their metal requirements mentioned. It is not a matter of telling untruths, but rather of leaving certain truths unsaid—especially when it comes to the material demands underpinning renewable energy solutions.

To quote the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland [12], ‘Solar PV technologies use a wide variety of semiconductor materials, which generate electricity when exposed to visible light. The most common to date are those using silicon.’

‘Wind energy provides a clean sustainable solution to our energy. It can be used as an alternative to fossil fuels in generating electricity, without the direct emission of greenhouse gases’ [13].

It is noteworthy that both quotations are short on specifics regarding the actual materials, that is, the trace metals used and their quantities. Whilst silicon (metal) is mentioned, there are no details, nor is there any mention of two other trace elements: gallium and indium, both of which occur in very small amounts, measured in ppb, in base metal deposits. Their recovery requires the generation of large volumes of waste and the consumption of large amounts of energy. With respect to wind energy, there is no mention of the substantial quantities of the two rare earth elements, neodymium and samarium, that are required, along with iron, and two other trace elements, cobalt and boron.

What is reliable? Peat and wood have always been seen as reliable. Then when coal, for both household and electricity generation, was identified as causing smog and contributing to lung disease, its reliability was overshadowed by its health effects. The recent storm Éowyn in January 2025, which caused substantial damage to the electricity network in Ireland, highlighted the challenges of achieving a smooth transition from one energy source to another, with people who still had access to fireplaces, having to revert to wood for heat and food preparation. Indeed, nuclear energy was initially promoted as being very reliable until several serious accidents occurred, in the United States (Three Mile Island, 1979), Ukraine (Chernobyl, 1986) and Japan (Fukushima, 2011). This suggests that the only currently reliable forms of electricity production are coal, oil, and gas, all of which are being phased out, except in the major economies like, the USA, China, India, and Russia.

What is meant by ‘access to affordable energy’? Cultural values and rural populations will have to be considered in this context. Those who have always used wood and charcoal for fires cannot simply be prevented from continuing such practices. Nor can nomadic peoples and those who live in a widely dispersed manner be forced to use methods of energy generation that are unaffordable, they simply do not have access to utilities like those that live in centralised areas. This would in many cases imply that they must travel tens or hundreds of kilometres per day to reach their workplace.

In the context of energy generation for more centralised urban environments, the high-risk and high-cost nature of mineral exploration and the environmental impact of producing the required metals must be considered. There is very little in SDG 7 to suggest that much thought was given to metal supply as a prerequisite for attaining this goal.

What is sustainable production? The central sub-question is what occurs if the limits of sustainable production are reached — for instance, if the discovery and production of metals fail to keep pace with the growing demand. In such a scenario, will producing countries prioritise domestic use, or should a degrowth strategy be considered? These debates are often shaped by the influence of environmental policy advocates, whose perspectives, may at times, overlook the views of the wider public, including those who elect democratic governments responsible for responding to their constituents’ needs.

  • SDG 8 seeks to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.

There is a recommendation to establish a new financial system to support both climate action and the achievement of the SDGs. However, as far as can be determined, no representatives from the mineral exploration or metals supply industries were involved in the relevant committee.  This may reflect the fact that banks and other financial institutions, excluding some pension funds, rarely lend to such projects especially to SMEs, due to the inherent risk that exploration may not be successful. While funding is available for exploration through international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the World Bank, it is not universally accessible to SMEs.

Within the reports on SDG 8, there are comments that illustrate how little is understood about the mineral exploration industry. Part of the issue lies in the frequent conflation of mineral exploration with mining, but these are two very distinct sectors. There is a failure to recognise the fundamental role that successful exploration plays in the discovery of mineral deposits. When referencing sustainable investing, there is one comment that typifies this avoidance—an ‘Inconvenient Truth’ problem—by citing the ‘best performing companies across industries’, but who performs best in successful exploration? It is not the multinational corporations, but rather SMEs and entrepreneurial geologists. Most major mining companies have  largely ceased grassroots exploration. Instead, they may offer direct financial support to explorationists—whether individuals or SMEs—or wait for signs of a promising discovery and then pursue merger and acquisition strategies.

We also acknowledge that State bodies within the ‘Eastern Bloc’ have undertaken successful exploration programmes, but it has been impossible to evaluate their costs. What concerns us is that a positive or best-in-class screening based on ‘best performing companies across industries’ must distinguish between the exploration and mining sectors. Hence the importance of making this distinction clear. It is therefore encouraging to see their role recognised by Ursula van der Leyen, President of the European Commission, who stated in 2022: ‘We must remove the obstacles that still hold our small companies back. They must be at the centre of this transformation – because they are the backbone of Europe’s long history of industrial prowess. Our future competitiveness depends on it.’

  • SDG 9 calls for actions to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and foster innovation.

Within the EU, building resilient infrastructure and promoting inclusivity are within the remit of government, whilst sustainable industrialisation and innovation are usually carried out by the private sector under regulations drafted by public authorities.

Minerals are where you find them or to be more precise, the deposits from which one develops and creates a mine with its attendant infrastructure, are where you find them. This self-evident truth is often lost when a debate starts about the merits of developing a deposit and a combination of bureaucrats and environmentalists wish to know why cadmium contained within the sphalerite crystal lattice cannot simply remain underground, or why the radioactive material within a rare earth deposit must be disposed of in a mine tailings pond or waste heap. Trace elements are invariably present in all mineral deposits and must be appropriately treated or neutralised. Yet, top-down decision-making and poor understanding of the risks often lead to cancelled development plans.

There are three small areas of control available to an explorer:

  1. The choice of country and/or area to be explored;
  2. The geology of a given area, which will initially determine whether it is considered prospective. For example, spodumene—the primary lithium-bearing mineral—is typically found in granite pegmatites, while Irish-style zinc–lead–(barytes) deposits occur in limestones;
  3. The extraction and processing methodologies, which are determined by a range of physio-chemical factors. These include grade (i.e., the amount of the primary metal present in the deposit), and the presence or absence of trace elements, which may negatively affect processing costs or, conversely, enhance the mines profitability.

The concept of sustainability has been discussed. However, there is a problem with the notion of sustainable economic growth, in the context of mineral development, because the extraction of a mineral resource is place-specific. Once a deposit is exhausted, meaning fully mined out, the only realistic alternative is to have a new deposit ready for extraction. It may be tens or hundreds of kilometres away. In such cases, economic growth at the original site will cease, and the expertise built through long-term planning will, ideally, be transferred elsewhere within the same country—but this will occur only if the country continues to support and incentivise exploration.

Whilst there are constant references to positive concepts such as resilience, infrastructure, sustainable development, urban settlements and climate initiatives there is no mention of the foundation upon which such concepts depend, namely mineral exploration.

  • SDG 12 is to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.

The concept of sustainable consumption and production was recognised in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, adopted in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). On that occasion, sustainable consumption and production were identified as one of the three overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development, alongside poverty eradication and the management of natural resources to foster economic and social development. However, beyond this reference, there are no concrete proposals regarding mineral exploration or mining.

Whilst there are several references to urban settlements, there is no mention of the mineral resources required to sustain them, particularly with respect to the metals required to generate, store, transmit, and supply the massive amounts of energy demanded by the ever-growing number of data centres. Furthermore, the SDGs give limited attention to the millions of people who do not live in urban settlements and the resources needed to ensure they have access to modern forms of energy and communication.

5. Concluding Remarks

Many will be familiar with the comments of former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, who in 2002 made the well-known remarks regarding ‘knowns and unknowns’, which remains highly relevant to today’s discussions on the supply of critical raw materials:

  • Known Knowns – We know that there is a shortage of raw materials production in the western world, particularly within the EU.
  • Known Unknowns – We know that more deposits exist, but we do not know their locations, grade or metallurgical characteristics.
  • Unknown Knowns – We do not know what, for example, the Chinese will do regarding production and pricing; and given the JIT system of supplies, we do not know when the next ship will become stranded in the Suez or Panama Canals, or when access to a port gets blocked.
  • Unknown Unknowns – For example, will the tension between economic development, rising demand, and sustainability become fundamentally irreconcilable?

The publication of the 59th European Geologist Journal offers an appropriate opportunity to acknowledge the work of the President, the Council, its sub-Committees and the Executive – particularly their participation at the annual UN Climate Change Conference, which represents a very welcome development. We say this in the light of the significant challenges in securing research funding that critically examines certain assumptions promoted by proponents of the green agenda.

This paper does not engage in debates over the reality of climate change; rather, it addresses the issues surrounding the sourcing of raw materials required for modern technologies, as well as the gaps and oversights present in prevailing narratives around the green transition. To date, there appears to be limited research from within the academic community focusing on the issue of metal-sourcing for the green transition. Much is made of the assertion that ‘the science tells us,’ yet science, and the research underpinning it, must be objective and supported by funding that allows for a balanced examination of differing perspectives. However, funding for  research that critically examines mainstream approaches to the green transition is often limited and difficult to obtain. In this context, the EFG’s openness to provide diverse perspectives represents a valuable contribution to the discourse. The development of sound, evidence-based policy requires access to independent research and a balanced consideration of differing viewpoints.

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This article has been published in European Geologist Journal 59 – UN Sustainable Development Goals – where the geology lies